



PEACE BEYOND BORDERS
LA PAIX AU-DELÀ DES FRONTIÈRES



PUTTING COMMUNITIES AT THE CENTRE OF PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

9 recommendations from a cross-border
response in Uganda and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo




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**“VIOLENCE CAN SHARPEN THE
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US,
LEADING SOME TO BELIEVE THAT
COEXISTENCE WITH THE SO-CALLED
OTHER IS IMPOSSIBLE.”**

KOFI ANNAN

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INTRODUCTION



Communities along the border between eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and western Uganda have faced a persistent and evolving threat from violent extremism. The borderlands are shaped by longstanding political and socio-economic grievances, scarce livelihood opportunities, population movements and, particularly in eastern DRC, limited state presence and the activities of multiple armed groups. Together, these dynamics create vulnerabilities that extremist actors exploit for recruitment, mobilisation

and the establishment of local support networks. Because the border region is highly porous and interconnected, insecurity, recruitment networks and the movement of armed actors cannot be understood in either country in isolation.

Transnational violent extremism is among the biggest security threats affecting both countries. In eastern DRC, it is responsible for over 52% of all conflict-related civilian deaths in the region and targets non-combatants in 94% of its violent actions¹.

While most attacks and operational bases are heavily concentrated in eastern DRC, disrupted plots, and the presence of recruitment hotspots and clandestine cells across eastern, central and western Uganda demonstrate the cross-border dynamics of violent extremism in the region.

Joint cross-border military operations conducted by the Ugandan and Congolese armed forces since late 2021 have disrupted established insurgent positions but have not eliminated the threat. Instead, the threat has adapted, fragmenting into smaller, highly mobile cells and relocating activities westwards into Ituri and southwards towards Lubero. The factors sustaining the threat differ across the two countries. In eastern DRC, recruitment relies on coercion, deception and economic incentives, with extremists exploiting limited state presence, local

tensions and trade in cocoa, timber and minerals to sustain their operations. In Uganda, recruitment vulnerabilities are linked to youth unemployment, economic marginalisation, longstanding grievances in the Rwenzori region, and gendered pathways such as fictitious marriages and family networks. The mountainous terrain of the Rwenzori region further facilitates movement across the border.

These dynamics demonstrate why this violent extremist threat cannot be addressed solely through a security lens or within national borders. The intensity of physical violence is currently greatest in eastern DRC, but the ecosystem enabling the threat extends across both countries. Prevention therefore requires addressing structural vulnerabilities to recruitment while strengthening cooperation between authorities, security actors, civil society organisations and border communities.

THE PEACE BEYOND BORDERS PROJECT: A CROSS-BORDER RESPONSE TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Against this backdrop, the Peace Beyond Borders (PBB) project was designed as an 18-month community-based and cross-border response to violent extremism in Uganda and the DRC. Funded by the European Union through its Foreign Policy Instrument (FPI) and implemented by the Kofi Annan Foundation (KAF), Pole Institute in the DRC, and Prospect

in Uganda in 2025-2026, the project adopted a whole-of-society approach², recognising that preventing violent extremism requires not only security responses, but also stronger local institutions, resilient communities, trust between state and non-state actors, and attention to the needs of those affected by violence.

¹ BBC Monitoring analysis, 29 November 2024, <https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b0002s5b>

² **A whole-of-society approach** is a collaborative strategy that unites all parts of a community—including the government, private sector, academic groups, and individual citizens—to solve complex problems or respond to major crises.

TARGET AREAS

The project targeted key border communities and stakeholders particularly exposed to these dynamics in both countries:

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

North Kivu Province (Beni city and territory) and Ituri Province (Bunia, Mambasa, and Irumu territories).

UGANDA

Kasese and Kampala districts, alongside at-risk communities in Wakiso, Masaka, Lwengo, Bugiri, and Iganga districts.

OBJECTIVES

Peace Beyond Borders addressed the cross-border challenges through three core objectives:

1 STRENGTHENING LOCALLY LED PREVENTION AND COLLABORATION

Peace Beyond Borders strengthened the capacities of local authorities, security forces, civil society, and communities to address violent extremism through joint dialogue and action.

2 IMPROVING THE INCLUSION AND RESILIENCE OF COMMUNITIES AT-RISK

Peace Beyond Borders supported communities vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist groups to strengthen their capacity to address their social and economic needs and grievances that can be exploited by violent actors, while building trust and engagement with authorities and the wider community.

3 SUPPORTING VICTIMS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Peace Beyond Borders strengthened the rights, resources, and platforms available to victims and victims' associations to enable their safe participation in prevention and peacebuilding efforts.

ABOUT THIS PAPER

This paper translates evidence and learning from project implementation into practical recommendations for consideration by policymakers, practitioners, and development partners. The recommendations build on approaches that have shown promise during project implementation, while addressing the challenges and gaps

encountered. The intention is not to prescribe a single model for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE), but to identify lessons and approaches that can be adapted to different institutional and community contexts in the DRC, Uganda and, where relevant, elsewhere.

METHODOLOGY

The recommendations were developed through a participatory learning process grounded in evidence and experience generated throughout project implementation. This included project monitoring data and activity-level assessments, participant and stakeholder feedback and testimonies, quarterly monitoring and reflection processes, and exchanges between the implementing partners. Towards the end of the project, the Kofi Annan Foundation,

Pole Institute and Prospect jointly reviewed implementation experiences to identify key lessons, challenges and promising practices and to consider their implications for future P/CVE policy and programming. These findings were subsequently analysed and translated into the recommendations presented in this paper, with particular attention to their relevance, feasibility and applicability for actors working at community, national and cross-border levels.

RECOMMENDATIONS

HOW CAN P/CVE RESPONSES ALIGN WITH THE TRANSNATIONAL NATURE OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM?

- 1 Institutionalise cross-border multi-stakeholder cooperation to address the transnational dimensions of violent extremism.

HOW CAN KEY STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL COLLABORATE TO PREVENT AND ADDRESS VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN HIGH-RISK REGIONS?

- 2 Establish and implement locally developed P/CVE plans and embed their implementation within existing local systems.
- 3 Embed a peacebuilding and inclusive development approach in P/CVE policy and implementation.
- 4 Assess, build and reinforce trust across the P/CVE ecosystem.
- 5 Institutionalise community-based early warning and response mechanisms in at-risk areas.



HOW CAN AT-RISK COMMUNITIES BE EMPOWERED TO BE LESS VULNERABLE TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM RECRUITMENT?

6

Make development and P/CVE programmes more inclusive and responsive to the needs of at-risk communities, as a way to better address the grievances of people vulnerable to violent extremist groups' recruitment or exploitation.

7

Embed community-owned and sustainable development approaches within P/CVE efforts to reduce the socioeconomic vulnerabilities exploited by violent extremist groups.


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Institutionalise gender-responsive approaches across P/CVE policy and programming.

HOW CAN TAILOR-MADE SUPPORT TO VICTIMS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM HELP THEM PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN P/CVE EFFORTS?

9

Ensure recognition of and differentiated support for victims of violent extremism.



HOW CAN P/CVE RESPONSES ALIGN WITH THE TRANSNATIONAL NATURE OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM?

1

Institutionalise cross-border multi-stakeholder cooperation to address the transnational dimensions of violent extremism.

DRC and Ugandan authorities should establish a permanent cross-border P/CVE cooperation framework that connects national and local authorities, security institutions, civil society and community-based prevention structures

to jointly analyse risks, exchange information and good practices, coordinate preventive action and strengthen cross-border early warning and response.

RATIONALE

Violent extremism operates across the DRC-Uganda border through interconnected recruitment and trafficking networks, movement of people and resources, illicit economies and financing, family and social networks, and extremist influence. Yet prevention structures remain predominantly organised within national boundaries and

are insufficiently connected across the border.

This creates **gaps in joint context analysis, information exchange, early warning, referral and coordinated preventive action**, even though the risks and networks that these structures seek to address are transnational.

Importantly, **the institutional gap is not primarily an absence of bilateral cooperation between DRC and Uganda. Cooperation already exists, particularly between security and counter-terrorism actors. Similar cross-border**

collaboration is needed on prevention efforts for the fight against violent extremism to be fully effective. As the North Kivu provincial P/CVE focal point observed:

“There is no permanent and effective cross-border P/CVE framework.”

CALL TO ACTION

The DRC and Uganda should establish a permanent, jointly owned cross-border P/CVE cooperation framework, led by the competent national P/CVE institutions and anchored within existing bilateral or cross-border coordination mechanisms wherever feasible, rather than creating

unnecessary parallel structures. The framework should connect national and border-level actors and provide regular mechanisms for joint context analysis, exchange of P/CVE practices and lessons, cross-border early warning and referral, and coordination of preventive action.

EVIDENCE FROM PEACE BEYOND BORDERS

Evidence from Peace Beyond Borders demonstrates that structured cross-border dialogue between local state and non-state actors is both achievable and essential for addressing the transnational dimensions of violent extremism. Through the project, three cross-border exchanges were organised among members of P/CVE working groups from Uganda and the DRC. This process led to the creation of a dedicated Cross-Border Steering

Committee, comprising eight members from the Ugandan working groups on P/CVE located at the border with DRC and the dialogue frameworks in DRC, alongside three state representatives from local government authorities (from Kasese District, North Kivu Province, and Ituri Province), which met regularly to establish joint priorities for cross-border action.

The committee identified key areas where cross-border cooperation was most urgent, notably establishing information-sharing protocols, building economic resilience among cross-border traders against illicit trade and violent extremism financing, and coordinating the rehabilitation and reintegration of former combatants. Beyond these priorities, these joint spaces directly enhanced local actors' understanding of shared threats and fostered mutual learning, providing a platform to exchange best practices on different issues such as reintegration of former combatants. As stressed by one of the Ugandan participants: *"I had never heard about violent extremism before this. Now, thanks to what I learned from participants in areas long affected*

by violence, I feel ready to anticipate the emerging threat in my own village." Crucially, joint expertise from project partners Prospect in Uganda and Pole Institute in DRC, as well as exchanges within these dialogue sessions, helped inform and enable the adoption of North Kivu's first ever P/CVE action plan. While Peace Beyond Borders successfully laid the groundwork and demonstrated strong political and community appetite for cross-border cooperation, these initiatives currently rely on project-based support. To ensure sustainable impact against transnational violent extremist threat, these community and local-level coordination spaces must be formally institutionalised in each country's P/CVE frameworks.

ACTIONABLE NEXT STEPS

National P/CVE and relevant government authorities – Uganda's National Centre for Counter Terrorism (NCTC) and DRC's National Committee for the Coordination of the Fight Against International Terrorism (CNCLT) as lead actors

- **ESTABLISH A BILATERAL CROSS-BORDER P/CVE COOPERATION FRAMEWORK**

Or formally integrate a P/CVE function into an appropriate existing DRC-Uganda cross-border coordination mechanism, with an agreed mandate covering joint context analysis, exchange of information and good practices, early warning/referral and coordinated prevention.

- **DESIGNATE NATIONAL FOCAL POINTS AND ESTABLISH CLEAR COORDINATION AND INFORMATION-SHARING PROTOCOLS**

Linking the framework with relevant ministries, security institutions and existing national P/CVE structures.

Provincial/district and border-level authorities

- **DESIGNATE P/CVE FOCAL POINTS WITHIN RELEVANT BORDER PROVINCES AND DISTRICTS AND CONNECT THEM THROUGH THE CROSS-BORDER FRAMEWORK**

Enabling regular exchange on emerging risks, community concerns, prevention priorities and actions requiring coordination across the border.

- **CONNECT EXISTING COMMUNITY-BASED EARLY WARNING MECHANISMS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER THROUGH AGREED REFERRAL AND RESPONSE PATHWAYS**

With clear arrangements for verification, confidentiality, escalation and feedback rather than creating a separate parallel early-warning system.

Civil society, community actors and P/CVE programmes

- **ENSURE STRUCTURED PARTICIPATION OF RELEVANT CSOS, COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION STRUCTURES AND PEACEBUILDING ACTORS IN CROSS-BORDER ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION**

Including identifying emerging risks, sharing community-level information through safeguarded channels and contributing to joint preventive responses.

- **PROVIDE INITIAL TECHNICAL AND CAPACITY SUPPORT TO OPERATIONALISE THE FRAMEWORK**

While progressively embedding its coordination and recurrent costs within the responsible national and subnational institutions.



HOW CAN KEY STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL COLLABORATE TO PREVENT AND ADDRESS VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN HIGH-RISK REGIONS?

2

Establish and implement locally developed P/CVE plans and embed their implementation within existing local systems.

National and local authorities should **formally establish, adopt and implement locally developed P/CVE plans** that translate national P/CVE priorities into context-specific actions, responsibilities and coordination frameworks. Implementation should be mainstreamed

within existing local government and community structures through minimum practices that clarify how each actor contributes to P/CVE through its routine responsibilities.

RATIONALE

National P/CVE policies and strategies provide an important overall framework, but they do not automatically translate into coordinated preventive action at provincial, district and community levels. The drivers and manifestations of violent extremism vary considerably between locations, as do the institutions,

community actors, vulnerabilities and opportunities that can contribute to prevention. **Local P/CVE plans provide a mechanism for translating broad national priorities into context-specific responsibilities and actions based on locally identified risks and capacities.**

However, developing a plan is not sufficient. Without formal adoption, clearly assigned responsibilities and integration into existing planning, coordination and reporting mechanisms, local P/CVE plans risk remaining dependent on individual

officials or externally funded projects. Institutionalisation is therefore important both for implementation and continuity, particularly where political leadership, personnel or funding may change.

CALL TO ACTION

Move from project-supported planning and coordination to formally adopted and implemented local P/CVE plans, with clear institutional ownership, responsibilities and accountability for

delivery. Rather than creating parallel P/CVE functions, plans should define how relevant government, security, civil society and community actors contribute through their existing mandates.

EVIDENCE FROM PEACE BEYOND BORDERS

In North Kivu, Peace Beyond Borders demonstrated how locally driven P/CVE planning can move from project-level coordination towards provincial ownership. Meetings of the project's Permanent Dialogue Framework led to the adoption of a local P/CVE action plan for Beni territory. During one of these meetings, the Provincial Government's representative stressed the importance of establishing a sustainable provincial framework: ***"Planning the actions to be undertaken by the Permanent Dialogue Framework is important. However, to ensure the sustainability of these efforts, they should instead be directed towards developing a provincial P/CVE plan that will serve as a Provincial Government framework applicable to all peace actors intending to work in this field in North Kivu."***

Continuous training and consultation subsequently contributed to the development of an integrated Provincial

P/CVE Plan in March 2026 and the appointment by the Governor of North Kivu of a dedicated provincial P/CVE focal point, with responsibility for coordinating the development, adoption and validation of the Plan and following up its implementation on behalf of the Provincial Government. This provided clear institutional ownership and accountability beyond the project.

The Plan also began serving as a reference framework for other actors. In July 2026, the United Nations mission supported youth and civil society leaders to develop early-warning initiatives aligned with it, while in August, Search for Common Ground supported state and non-state actors to identify three priority advocacy actions for its implementation.

ACTIONABLE NEXT STEPS

National/local authorities

- **FORMALISE LOCALLY DEVELOPED P/CVE PLANS THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUMENT AND ASSIGN RESPONSIBILITY FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING.**

Local authorities

- **TRANSLATE THE PLAN INTO ANNUAL PRIORITIES, DESIGNATED RESPONSIBILITIES AND ROUTINE COORDINATION MECHANISMS.**

National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) Uganda

- **ADOPT AND PILOT THE PBB MINIMUM PRACTICES AS AN OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MAINSTREAMING P/CVE INTO THE EXISTING RESPONSIBILITIES OF SUB-COUNTY, TOWN COUNCIL AND COMMUNITY-LEVEL ACTORS.**

North Kivu Provincial Government

- **FORMALLY ADOPT AND OPERATIONALISE THE PROVINCIAL INTEGRATED P/CVE PLAN, ASSIGNING CLEAR RESPONSIBILITIES TO RELEVANT PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL INSTITUTIONS, INTEGRATING PRIORITY ACTIONS INTO THEIR EXISTING WORKPLANS AND BUDGETS, AND ESTABLISHING A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER MECHANISM TO REGULARLY MONITOR IMPLEMENTATION, REVIEW EVOLVING RISKS AND REPORT ON PROGRESS.**

Development partners/P/CVE programmes

- **ALIGN TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT WITH PRIORITIES IDENTIFIED IN LOCALLY OWNED PLANS RATHER THAN ESTABLISHING PARALLEL PRIORITIES.**



3

Embed a peacebuilding and inclusive development approach in P/CVE policy and implementation.

Using a peacebuilding and inclusive development approach, national and local authorities should focus their P/CVE efforts on addressing the wider

vulnerabilities, grievances and exclusion that increase people's susceptibility to violent extremist recruitment.

RATIONALE

When P/CVE is framed predominantly through a counter-terrorism and security lens, communities and institutions tend to view it exclusively as a state security matter rather than a shared responsibility. This narrow perception disempowers local actors, leaving institutions and communities unaware of their own vital role in prevention - thereby undermining the broader preventive space.

Participation broadens when P/CVE is understood as addressing exclusion, grievances, and vulnerabilities through prevention and inclusive development. But this requires more than a change in terminology: local coordination structures need to be able to connect community concerns to institutions capable of responding to them.

CALL TO ACTION

Translate the holistic approach already present in national P/CVE discourses into local implementation by making conflict prevention, dialogue, social and

economic inclusion, and community participation explicit components of local P/CVE responsibilities.

EVIDENCE FROM PEACE BEYOND BORDERS

In Uganda, Peace Beyond Borders demonstrated how a peacebuilding and development approach can broaden P/CVE from a predominantly security concern into a shared responsibility to ensure the development, governance and protection of the community. In Munkunyu, engagement through the project's Working Group helped local officials recognise that at-risk groups already identified by security structures also required socioeconomic support. Security and community-development officials jointly connected former fighters, abductees, survivors of terrorist attacks, widows of former royal guards and vulnerable youth to existing government programmes.

Rather than creating a parallel P/CVE service, the process helped officials use existing institutional mechanisms differently to address vulnerabilities with a prevention objective. Building on this integrated approach, in Bwera Division, motorcycle taxi riders - many of whom

were unemployed or economically vulnerable youth exposed to financial recruitment offers - combined vigilance and non-violence practices with economic self-reliance. Through the project's awareness-raising activities, riders realised how their economic insecurity increased their vulnerability to recruitment and manipulation by violent extremist groups. Determined to empower themselves, they revived savings schemes that mobilised six million Ugandan shillings in ten days. This capital enabled members to launch concrete empowerment projects, including buying their own motorcycles (instead of riding someone else's motorcycle), laying bricks to construct their houses, and starting other small businesses. As one of these taxi riders reflected: ***"Our mindset on security has totally changed. We used to think security was the business of security personnel, but we now know it begins with us."***

ACTIONABLE NEXT STEPS

National/local authorities, P/CVE actors

- INCORPORATE PEACEBUILDING, SOCIAL INCLUSION AND DEVELOPMENT RESPONSIBILITIES INTO GUIDANCE FOR SUBNATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF P/CVE STRATEGIES.

Local authorities

- INCLUDE COMMUNITY DIALOGUE, GRIEVANCE IDENTIFICATION AND REFERRAL TO RELEVANT DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL SERVICES WITHIN LOCAL P/CVE ACTION PLANS.

Development actors

- ASSESS WHETHER EXISTING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES REACH COMMUNITIES AND GROUPS FACING EXCLUSION OR VULNERABILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH VIOLENT EXTREMIST RISK, AND ESTABLISH APPROPRIATE REFERRAL PATHWAYS RATHER THAN CREATING STAND-ALONE “COUNTER-TERRORISM” INTERVENTIONS.

P/CVE practitioners

- USE LOCALLY APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE AND FRAMING THAT ENABLES PARTICIPATION OF AT-RISK GROUPS WITHOUT UNNECESSARILY LABELLING THEM THROUGH TERRORISM-RELATED TERMINOLOGY.

“We used to think security was the business of security personnel, but we now know it begins with us.”



4 Assess, build and reinforce trust across the P/CVE ecosystem.

National and local authorities and P/CVE actors should systematically assess trust dynamics between communities, civil society, local authorities and security actors. As a key step towards community participation and effective information

sharing, reporting and early warning, they should integrate deliberate trust-building and reinforcement measures throughout the design, implementation and monitoring of P/CVE interventions.

RATIONALE

The effectiveness of P/CVE interventions depends heavily on the quality of relationships between communities, civil society, local authorities and security institutions. Communities are more likely to raise concerns, participate in dialogue or share sensitive information when they believe that institutions will respond

appropriately and that engagement will not expose them to retaliation, stigma or other harm. Likewise, authorities and security actors need confidence in the legitimacy and reliability of community and civil-society counterparts with whom they engage.

Peace Beyond Borders experience suggests that **trust is therefore both a precondition for effective prevention and an outcome that P/CVE interventions can strengthen.** Sustained dialogue and collaboration can enable actors who previously viewed one another with suspicion to develop working relationships, better understand their respective roles and increasingly address peace and security challenges jointly. At the same time, trust

should not be assumed simply because stakeholders participate in the same activity or coordination structure. It may differ considerably between actors, change over time and deteriorate rapidly following security incidents, human-rights concerns or breaches of confidentiality. P/CVE interventions therefore need to assess on a regular basis where trust exists, where it is weak, what factors shape it and which actors can serve as credible intermediaries.

CALL TO ACTION

Make trust-building between state institutions, civil society organisations, at-risk groups and the wider community a deliberate and measurable dimension of

P/CVE programming to ensure effective information flows and cooperation for prevention.

EVIDENCE FROM PEACE BEYOND BORDERS

Peace Beyond Borders demonstrated that trust in P/CVE depends on how institutions engage with and respond to communities. In Kawempe, some community members were reluctant to report concerns directly to police because they feared detention or harsh interrogation. As one motorcycle taxi rider explained: *“When we report to the police...government officials often turn the accusation back on me, the reporter. I then end up being handcuffed.”*

Peace Beyond Borders therefore worked through trusted intermediaries to strengthen relationships between communities and security actors. In Munkunyu, security actors provided direct contact points and committed to improving their responsiveness. In

parallel, the project actively engaged with groups who interact daily with the community, including motorcycle taxi riders (“boda boda”) and landlords. These joint trust-building activities strengthened confidence in security actors and empowered these groups to recognise their unique position in leading community prevention efforts. As one rider reflected: **“We, as boda boda riders, must exert significant effort to prevent terrorism. This is because we act as ‘transmitters’, transporting people”.** A landlord in Munkunyu used these direct channels to report a suspicious tenant, leading to immediate police action. Similarly, boda-boda riders engaged in the project started reporting suspicious luggage or passengers.

In Munkunyu, they assisted in the identification and apprehension of individuals suspected to be linked to the November 2025 attacks, while riders in Mpondwe identified a device that children were playing with and alerted the security services, who safely neutralised the explosive device. The contrast between these experiences highlights

the importance of adapting engagement channels to existing levels of trust. Where direct engagement with security institutions generates fear or suspicion, trusted intermediaries can provide safer entry points; over time, consistent and appropriate institutional responses can help strengthen confidence and cooperation.

ACTIONABLE NEXT STEPS

National/local authorities and P/CVE implementing partners

- **CONDUCT TRUST AND STAKEHOLDER ANALYSES AT THE OUTSET OF P/CVE INTERVENTIONS AND PERIODICALLY UPDATE THEM AS RELATIONSHIPS AND CONFLICT DYNAMICS EVOLVE. ADAPT ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIES WHEN MISTRUST, FEAR, POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES OR CHANGING RELATIONSHIPS BEGIN TO UNDERMINE PARTICIPATION.**

P/CVE coordination structures

- **IDENTIFY AND USE TRUSTED, CONTEXT-APPROPRIATE COMMUNITY, RELIGIOUS, PROFESSIONAL OR CIVIL SOCIETY INTERMEDIARIES WHERE DIRECT ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN COMMUNITIES AND INSTITUTIONS IS DIFFICULT.**

Local authorities and security actors

- **CREATE SUSTAINED OPPORTUNITIES FOR DIALOGUE AND JOINT ACTION BETWEEN COMMUNITIES, CSOS AND INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS, RATHER THAN RELYING ON ONE-OFF CONSULTATIONS.**

Counter-terrorism actors, justice actors, and relevant security authorities

- **PUT IN PLACE PROTECTION AND CONFIDENTIALITY SAFEGUARDS THAT REINFORCE TRUST, INCLUDING SAFE REPORTING PROCEDURES AND APPROPRIATE SECURITY SUPPORT FOR CSOS AND COMMUNITY ACTORS UNDERTAKING LEGITIMATE P/CVE ACTIVITIES.**



5

Institutionalise community-based early warning and response mechanisms in at-risk areas.

National/local authorities and P/CVE programmes should establish community-based early-warning mechanisms where absent, or formally recognise and integrate existing mechanisms into P/

CVE and local governance systems, with clear pathways and responsibilities for receiving, verifying, referring and responding to community-generated alerts.

RATIONALE

Communities are often among the first to observe signs of emerging violent-extremism risks, including unfamiliar movements, recruitment attempts, threats or changes in local behaviour. Community leaders, civil society

organisations, landlords, transport workers and other trusted local actors may therefore hold information that formal institutions cannot easily access through conventional channels.

However, Peace Beyond Borders experience shows that early warning has limited preventive value unless reporting is safe and trusted and alerts lead to appropriate action. Several participants shared frustrations about the lack of reaction from security personnel, which demotivated them to continue elevating information about risks and vulnerabilities. Where no community-based early-warning mechanism exists, establishing one can create a structured link between this local knowledge and institutions able to assess and respond to potential threats. Where mechanisms already exist—including those established through projects or community initiatives—the priority should be to formally recognise and integrate them into existing P/CVE and local governance systems rather than create parallel structures or allow

them to disappear when project funding ends.

Clear responsibilities and pathways are needed for receiving, verifying, referring and responding to community-generated alerts. It is also important to provide feedback to those who report concerns. Early warning mechanisms must also include appropriate confidentiality and protection measures for community members and civil society actors sharing sensitive information, particularly where reporting may expose them to retaliation, stigma or other risks. Joint ownership by communities, civil society and relevant authorities can help ensure that these mechanisms remain both locally accessible and connected to institutional response.

CALL TO ACTION

Authorities should move from project-supported or informal early warning arrangements towards recognised and adequately resourced community-based early warning and response mechanisms,

with jointly agreed roles, reporting channels, response responsibilities, protection safeguards and feedback procedures.

EVIDENCE FROM PEACE BEYOND BORDERS

In eastern DRC, the proactive sharing of early warnings has delivered **concrete results in preventing imminent assaults and mitigating civilian casualties**. Rather than treating P/CVE as the responsibility of security institutions alone, the joint early warning mechanisms established by Peace Beyond Borders in Beni and Bunia created channels through which

community knowledge could inform timely institutional action. In January 2026, the mechanism which brings together community leaders, local authorities and defence and security actors from Beni collected and channelled an alert regarding armed unknown individuals travelling towards Mamové, in the Beni-Mbau sector of Beni territory.

Following this information, the Congolese armed forces sent additional troops and were able to prevent the attack. In February 2026, the mechanism alerted security services about a violent extremist group's presence in Pwenti. Soldiers were deployed and managed to stop the assault on the village before any casualties were reported.

These examples underline the critical link between **community capacity to detect risks, safe and trusted reporting channels, and timely institutional response**. Weakness at any point in this chain can prevent community-based early warning from translating into preventive action.

ACTIONABLE NEXT STEPS

National/local authorities and P/CVE institutions

- ◉ **FORMALLY RECOGNISE EXISTING COMMUNITY-BASED EARLY WARNING MECHANISMS AND CONNECT THEM TO THE COMPETENT LOCAL AND NATIONAL PREVENTION AND SECURITY STRUCTURES.**

Security services, local authorities and civil society

- ◉ **JOINTLY DEFINE PROTOCOLS COVERING IDENTIFICATION, REPORTING, VERIFICATION, REFERRAL, RESPONSE AND FOLLOW-UP OF ALERTS.**

National/local authorities

- ◉ **ALLOCATE RECURRENT RESOURCES FOR COORDINATION, COMMUNICATION, CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT AND FOLLOW-UP OF ALERT MECHANISMS TO REDUCE DEPENDENCE ON PROJECT FINANCING.**

Security authorities

- ◉ **ESTABLISH APPROPRIATE CONFIDENTIALITY AND PROTECTION MEASURES FOR COMMUNITY MEMBERS AND CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS SHARING SENSITIVE INFORMATION.**

National/local/security authorities

- ◉ **WHERE SECURITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY CONSIDERATIONS PERMIT, PROVIDE FEEDBACK ON ACTION TAKEN FOLLOWING COMMUNITY ALERTS, REINFORCING TRUST AND CONTINUED PARTICIPATION.**



HOW CAN AT-RISK COMMUNITIES BE EMPOWERED TO BE LESS VULNERABLE TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM RECRUITMENT?

6

Make development and P/CVE programmes more inclusive and responsive to the needs of at-risk communities, as a way to better address the grievances of people vulnerable to violent extremist groups' recruitment or exploitation.

Government, development and P/CVE actors should move from passive non-discrimination in their programmes to proactive, conflict-sensitive inclusion of at-risk individuals and communities,

ensuring that their interventions respond to their differentiated needs, vulnerabilities and barriers to participation that can increase susceptibility to violent-extremist recruitment.

RATIONALE

Formal openness of development and P/CVE programmes does not necessarily translate into meaningful inclusion. Individuals and communities vulnerable to violent extremist recruitment are not homogeneous: their exposure to violence,

displacement, socioeconomic exclusion, their relationships with institutions, their religious or social affiliations, and their access to opportunities may differ significantly.

Treating them as a single category can therefore lead programmes to engage the wrong stakeholders, misunderstand internal power and influence dynamics, or offer opportunities that some groups cannot or will not access. As a result, the grievances and vulnerabilities that programmes seek to address may persist and remain open to exploitation by violent extremist groups.

CALL TO ACTION

Government, development and P/CVE actors should systematically identify and address the specific barriers preventing at risk individuals from benefiting from existing social, economic and civic opportunities. This requires regular context, vulnerability, stakeholder and power analysis; proactive outreach through trusted and legitimate community actors; and adaptation of programmes

Effective inclusion therefore requires programmes to ask not only who is eligible, but who is missing, why they are missing, what prevents their participation, and which trusted pathways can reach them. This requires sustained engagement because trust, institutional relationships and access cannot be established through a single consultation or outreach activity.

where existing modalities unintentionally exclude particular groups.

At-risk communities should also be involved in shaping the development responses intended to address their vulnerabilities, including through participation in relevant local development planning processes.

EVIDENCE FROM PEACE BEYOND BORDERS

In the DRC, Peace Beyond Borders' engagement with former combatants highlighted the difficulty of sustaining disengagement when the socioeconomic vulnerabilities associated with recruitment remain unresolved. Former combatants described unemployment and the lack of viable livelihood opportunities as factors increasing young people's vulnerability to recruitment by violent extremist groups and their allies.

One former combatant reported that some individuals who had left armed groups subsequently returned to hostilities after finding that civilian life offered insufficient opportunities to achieve economic and financial autonomy. This highlights a critical gap between disengagement and sustainable reintegration: leaving an armed or violent extremist group does not necessarily remove the socioeconomic pressures that contributed to recruitment or can create vulnerability to re-recruitment.

Peace Beyond Borders therefore identified support to youth-led entrepreneurial and livelihood initiatives in at-risk communities as one avenue for addressing these vulnerabilities and strengthening the economic foundations for sustainable reintegration. Based on Pole Institute's context analysis, priority

was given to young people and former combatants from the territories most affected by violent extremism. Beyond training in entrepreneurship, it made sure to provide sustained accompaniment to young people as they were developing and implementing their small business - from chicken farms to soap making.

ACTIONABLE NEXT STEPS

National/local authorities and development and P/CVE programmes

- **REQUIRE PERIODIC CONTEXT, VULNERABILITY, STAKEHOLDER AND INFLUENCE ANALYSIS WHEN DESIGNING P/CVE INTERVENTIONS TARGETING AT-RISK GROUPS, INCLUDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONTEXT-SPECIFIC INDICATORS OF VULNERABILITY.**
- **DEVELOP GUIDANCE FOR THE PROACTIVE AND CONFLICT-SENSITIVE INCLUSION OF VE-VULNERABLE GROUPS WITHIN SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND CIVIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES.**
- **COORDINATE AND ESTABLISH REFERRAL PATHWAYS BETWEEN P/CVE ACTORS AND RELEVANT GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES SO THAT IDENTIFIED NEEDS CAN BE CONNECTED TO EXISTING SERVICES AND OPPORTUNITIES.**
- **REGULARLY ASSESS AND RESPOND TO THE DIFFERENTIATED VULNERABILITIES AND BARRIERS OF AT-RISK GROUPS BY UPDATING INCLUSION, STAKEHOLDER AND POWER ANALYSES THROUGHOUT IMPLEMENTATION; WORKING THROUGH TRUSTED COMMUNITY LEADERS, PROFESSIONALS, CSOS AND LEGITIMATE INSTITUTIONS TO REACH UNDER-REPRESENTED GROUPS; ADAPTING PROGRAMME MODALITIES AND SUPPORT TO THEIR SPECIFIC NEEDS; AND TRACKING ACTUAL PARTICIPATION, ACCESS AND OUTCOMES TO ENSURE MEANINGFUL INCLUSION.**
- **PROVIDE APPROPRIATE TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO RELEVANT REINTEGRATION STRUCTURES, TO STRENGTHEN THE SUSTAINABLE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION OF FORMER COMBATANTS.**

Local government

- IDENTIFY AND ENGAGE AT-RISK AND UNDER-REPRESENTED GROUPS THAT ARE NOT ACCESSING EXISTING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES, RECOGNISING DIFFERENCES IN VULNERABILITY AND BARRIERS TO PARTICIPATION.
- ENSURE THE MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION OF AT-RISK GROUPS, IN RELEVANT LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCESSES, SO THAT THEIR PRIORITIES AND VULNERABILITIES INFORM LOCAL RESPONSES.
- ASSIGN RESPONSIBLE OFFICERS TO ENSURE THE PROPER FOLLOW UP TO REFERRALS RECEIVED AND COMMITMENTS MADE DURING ENGAGEMENT WITH AT-RISK COMMUNITIES.



7

Embed community-owned and sustainable development approaches within P/CVE efforts to reduce the socioeconomic vulnerabilities exploited by violent extremist groups.

Government, development and P/CVE actors should enable at-risk communities to develop their own responses to their socioeconomic vulnerabilities by supporting community-owned

development strategies, strengthening trusted community institutions, and investing in their capacity to access, manage and sustain development opportunities.

RATIONALE

Violent extremist groups exploit socioeconomic vulnerabilities as part of their recruitment strategy, riding on the challenges facing disadvantaged communities, such as limited employment and livelihood opportunities, barriers to

education and markets, and perceptions of economic marginalisation. As a response, they offer access to real or fake opportunities, income or economic justice.

Peace Beyond Borders experience suggests that addressing these vulnerabilities requires more than sensitisation, short-term capacity building or isolated livelihood opportunities. **Where vulnerabilities are multidimensional and deeply rooted, communities need greater agency to identify their development priorities and translate them into sustained social, economic, civic and institutional responses.**

This also requires investment in the institutions through which communities organise themselves. Trusted community and faith-based institutions may perform

functions extending well beyond their formal religious or social roles—including leadership, education, welfare, mobilisation and support—and can therefore provide important platforms for community resilience. However, communities and their institutions may not initially have the governance, financial, legal or organisational capacity required to access and sustainably manage development opportunities. **Investing in their development readiness is therefore part of addressing vulnerability, rather than a prerequisite that communities must already meet to qualify for support.**

CALL TO ACTION

Government, development partners and P/CVE actors should move beyond short-term or externally defined socioeconomic assistance by enabling at-risk communities to develop and implement their own longer-term development strategies and by strengthening the institutions capable of sustaining those strategies. Technical

assistance, partnerships and financing should be aligned with locally identified priorities and accompanied by sufficient institutional development to enable communities to progressively manage resources, mobilise additional support and sustain initiatives beyond individual projects.

EVIDENCE FROM PEACE BEYOND BORDERS

Peace Beyond Borders' engagement with Salafi communities in Uganda evolved from interventions targeting specific groups—including youth, women, returnees and other vulnerable members—towards a broader community-owned development approach. Engagement with community leaders and professionals revealed interconnected social, economic, civic and institutional vulnerabilities that could not be adequately addressed

through separate interventions alone. Through leadership and professional training, problem and solution analysis, consultations and professional engagement, Salafi communities developed their first 5-Year Strategy and Action Plan for Social, Economic, Civic and Institutional Development, providing a community-owned framework for addressing these vulnerabilities over time.

In Bugiri, this approach began translating into institutional action. Trained leaders registered their mosque as a non-profit organisation, established a bank account, registered members, and documented their community's social characteristics,

skills, challenges and needs to inform future planning. Despite limited financial resources, they also hired a consultant to support proposal development, demonstrating their commitment to mobilising resources for implementation.

ACTIONABLE NEXT STEPS

Government and relevant P/CVE authorities

- **INTEGRATE COMMUNITY-OWNED DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES INTO P/CVE PROGRAMMES, ENSURING THAT PREVENTION RESPONSES ADDRESS THE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, CIVIC AND INSTITUTIONAL VULNERABILITIES OF TARGETED COMMUNITIES, ALONGSIDE THEIR SENSITISATION EFFORTS AND SECURITY INTERVENTIONS.**
- **RECOGNISE AND ENGAGE TRUSTED COMMUNITY AND FAITH-BASED INSTITUTIONS AS POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT AND RESILIENCE ACTORS, BASED ON THEIR ACTUAL FUNCTIONS, LEGITIMACY AND INFLUENCE WITHIN COMMUNITIES.**

Development partners, P/CVE programmes and private-sector actors

- **ALIGN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, PARTNERSHIPS AND CATALYTIC FINANCING WITH COMMUNITY-OWNED DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES, SUPPORTING COMMUNITIES TO TRANSLATE IDENTIFIED VULNERABILITIES INTO FEASIBLE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, CIVIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ACTIONS RATHER THAN IMPOSING EXTERNALLY DETERMINED INTERVENTIONS.**
- **COMBINE FINANCING WITH SUSTAINED INVESTMENT IN COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS' DEVELOPMENT READINESS AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY, INCLUDING THEIR GOVERNANCE, LEGAL AND FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT, RESOURCE MOBILISATION AND INCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION, USING FLEXIBLE TIMELINES AND ACCOMPANIMENT APPROPRIATE TO THE STARTING CAPACITY OF COMMUNITIES AND THEIR INSTITUTIONS.**



8 Institutionalise gender-responsive approaches across P/CVE policy and programming.

Government, P/CVE institutions and development partners should systematically analyse and respond to how gender shapes vulnerabilities, recruitment pathways, resilience,

participation and recovery, and translate this analysis into differentiated objectives, interventions, budgets, safeguarding measures and monitoring.

RATIONALE

Gender influences how individuals experience violent extremism, including their exposure to recruitment and violence, the roles they may assume within or in response to violent extremist groups, their access to economic and social opportunities, and their pathways towards disengagement, recovery and

reintegration. **These experiences and vulnerabilities can differ between women and men and may also vary within each group according to age, socioeconomic status, displacement, religion and other contextual factors.**

P/CVE interventions that treat communities as gender-neutral therefore risk overlooking important drivers of vulnerability or designing responses that are more accessible or appropriate for one group than another. For example, socioeconomic pressures and expectations associated with masculinity may influence the vulnerabilities of some young men to recruitment, while women may experience different barriers to economic participation, decision-making and engagement in P/CVE. Women and men may also face different physical,

emotional, social or reputational risks when participating in prevention activities.

Gender mainstreaming should therefore **not be reduced to achieving numerical representation of women**. It requires understanding how gender shapes risks, needs, roles, influence and opportunities in a particular context and using that analysis to design differentiated responses. Where analysis identifies specific inequalities or barriers affecting women or men, targeted measures may be necessary.

CALL TO ACTION

National P/CVE institutions, government authorities and development partners should require gender analysis throughout P/CVE policy and programme cycles and ensure that identified

differences in the needs, vulnerabilities, capacities and risks of women and men inform programme objectives, resource allocation, implementation, safeguarding and monitoring.

EVIDENCE FROM PEACE BEYOND BORDERS

In Uganda, the project addressed specific gendered recruitment pathways within the Salafi community, which is the primary community targeted by violent extremist groups, where women face distinct risks due to male family dependency and exploitation of their reproductive roles. Peace Beyond Borders trained national and regional male (Amirs) and female (Amirats) religious leaders on inclusive community development, directly challenging

stereotypes that exclude women from decision-making. As a result, women's protection, participation, and economic empowerment are now embedded in the 5-year Salafi Community Strategy. By tailoring interventions to specific gendered dynamics, this case illustrates how embedding gender analysis directly into institutional strategies enables addressing the underlying vulnerabilities that extremist groups exploit.

ACTIONABLE NEXT STEPS

National P/CVE and government institutions

- **INTEGRATE GENDER ANALYSIS AND GENDER-RESPONSIVE REQUIREMENTS INTO NATIONAL AND LOCAL P/CVE POLICIES, PLANS AND OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE, WITH INDICATORS THAT ASSESS DIFFERENTIATED VULNERABILITIES, PARTICIPATION AND OUTCOMES FOR WOMEN AND MEN RATHER THAN PARTICIPATION NUMBERS ALONE.**

Development partners and P/CVE programmes

- **CONDUCT AND PERIODICALLY UPDATE GENDER ANALYSES AND TRANSLATE FINDINGS INTO DIFFERENTIATED INTERVENTIONS, EXAMINING HOW GENDER AFFECTS RECRUITMENT RISKS AND NARRATIVES, SOCIOECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES, ACCESS TO OPPORTUNITIES, COMMUNITY ROLES, PARTICIPATION, DISENGAGEMENT AND RECOVERY.**

HOW CAN TAILOR-MADE SUPPORT TO VICTIMS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM HELP THEM PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN P/CVE EFFORTS?



9 Ensure recognition of and differentiated support for victims of violent extremism.

National authorities should establish clear and inclusive definitions and categories of victims of violent extremism and use these as the basis for

differentiated recognition, compensation and support, thus encouraging their safe and meaningful participation in P/CVE processes.

RATIONALE

Existing P/CVE and victim-support frameworks do not consistently recognise the full range of people harmed by violent extremism or the different forms and consequences of victimisation.

Definitions may be incomplete, unclear or applied inconsistently, creating uncertainty over who qualifies as a victim and potentially excluding some categories from recognition and assistance.

At the same time, expanding victim status to categories that are not readily perceived by other victims or communities as victims can itself generate resentment if the basis for their recognition is not clearly defined and communicated. This is particularly sensitive where individuals have had complex or overlapping experiences, for example, people who suffered harm while also having been associated with violent extremist groups. Recognising such individuals as victims without clearly explaining the nature of the victimisation being recognised, the criteria applied, and the rights or entitlements that follow from

that recognition can create perceptions of equivalence between different experiences of harm or of rewarding those perceived as perpetrators.

Clear and inclusive definitions are therefore necessary both to prevent unjustified exclusion and ensure that inclusion is legitimate, transparent and understood. This matters because recognition has practical consequences as it determines eligibility for compensation or reparation, access to psychosocial, health, livelihood, legal and other support, representation through victims' organisations, and opportunities to participate in P/CVE processes.

CALL TO ACTION

National authorities, in consultation with victims' organisations and relevant P/CVE and victim-support actors, should review and clarify definitions and categories of victims of violent extremism and establish what recognition means in practice for

different categories, including eligibility and pathways for compensation/reparation, support and services, representation, and participation in P/CVE processes.

EVIDENCE FROM PEACE BEYOND BORDERS

Peace Beyond Borders' work with victims of violent extremism revealed significant diversity in experiences of victimisation. Participants included direct survivors, widows and widowers, children, parents and siblings of people killed or injured, persons with physical disabilities, people experiencing less visible psychological trauma, and families of abducted persons. In Uganda, the latter reported receiving no compensation despite the prolonged distress associated with not knowing the

fate of their relatives. Differences in the nature and severity of harm also created tensions between victims over whose experiences warranted greater attention or leadership. At the national level, Peace Beyond Borders further identified differing interpretations among counter-terrorism actors of who qualifies as a victim, including whether this category extends to former fighters and people formerly associated with violent extremist groups.

The practical implications of recognition were also evident in the DRC. Peace Beyond Borders mapped 40 victims' associations across Beni city and territory, Bunia, Irumu and Mambasa, yet none had accessed the National Fund for Victims' Reparation (FONAREV) support. The mapping identified failure to meet the Fund's eligibility requirements as a principal barrier, compounded by the absence of local FONAREV representation in the areas concerned, which limited associations' ability to engage with the Fund and advocate for access to its support. However, Peace Beyond Borders' activities demonstrated how structured spaces for exchange helped victims play a more active role in P/CVE. Pole Institute organised joint sessions that helped break down protocol

barriers between victims, at-risk young people, community leaders and decision-makers. Beyond providing a therapeutic dimension for several victims, these informal advocacy settings enabled victims to present grievances directly to authorities. This resulted in immediate commitments by the authorities to provide the necessary support, thus demonstrating how victims' recognition and dialogue spaces are key to victims' engagement as active partners in P/CVE. These experiences show why clear and inclusive definitions of victimhood need to distinguish different forms and circumstances of harm and be linked to transparent, accessible pathways for differentiated support, compensation, representation and participation.

ACTIONABLE NEXT STEPS

National P/CVE and victim-support institutions

- **REVIEW AND CLARIFY NATIONAL DEFINITIONS AND CATEGORIES OF VICTIMS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM**

Through consultation with victims' associations and relevant stakeholders, ensuring that different forms of harm and victimisation are adequately recognised and that criteria are sufficiently clear to avoid arbitrary inclusion or exclusion.

- **DEFINE THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECOGNITION FOR DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF VICTIMS**

Including eligibility and referral pathways for compensation/reparation, psychosocial and health services, livelihood and social support, legal assistance, representation and participation in relevant P/CVE processes.

National/Local authorities and victim-support institutions/organisations

- **DECENTRALISE OR ESTABLISH ACCESSIBLE REFERRAL MECHANISMS FOR VICTIM IDENTIFICATION, RECOGNITION AND SUPPORT IN AFFECTED AREAS, WORKING THROUGH CREDIBLE LOCAL ORGANISATIONS WHERE APPROPRIATE.**

P/CVE actors and development partners

- **ADAPT ENGAGEMENT WITH AND SUPPORT TO DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF VICTIMS BASED ON THEIR NEEDS, CAPACITIES AND RISKS, ENSURING THAT PARTICIPATION IS VOLUNTARY, SAFE AND BENEFICIAL AND THAT DIGNITY, CONSENT, PRIVACY AND PSYCHOSOCIAL WELLBEING TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ADVOCACY OR COMMUNICATION OBJECTIVES.**

Victims' associations

- **ENSURE INCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION OF DIFFERENT CATEGORIES AND EXPERIENCES OF VICTIMHOOD, DOCUMENTING DIFFERENTIATED NEEDS AND IDENTIFYING GAPS IN RECOGNITION, COMPENSATION, SUPPORT AND INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO INFORM ADVOCACY AND POLICY ENGAGEMENT.**

National Fund for Victims' Reparation - FONAREV (DRC)

- **DECENTRALISE OPERATIONS AND ENHANCE LOCAL ACCESSIBILITY IN NORTH KIVU**
Establishing an adapted decentralised presence to overcome the barriers victims face in accessing centralised services in Kinshasa.
- **ESTABLISH SYSTEMATIC PARTNERSHIPS WITH LOCAL VICTIM-SUPPORT ORGANISATIONS OPERATING IN NORTH-KIVU**
Leveraging their proximity to affected communities and knowledge of specific victim needs to deliver more accessible and context-sensitive interventions.

ABOUT THE PARTNERS

KOFI ANNAN FOUNDATION



Kofi Annan
Foundation

The Kofi Annan Foundation is an independent not-for-profit organisation, established in Switzerland in 2007 by the late former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. Through partnerships with local and youth-led organisations, and multilateral and institutional actors, the

Foundation works to build a fairer and more peaceful world, where no one is left behind, democratic principles and the rule of law are upheld, and divides are bridged through dialogue and international cooperation.



KOFIANNANFOUNDATION.ORG

PROSPECT INITIATIVE



Prospect is a non-profit peacebuilding and development organisation founded in 2011 by Ndugwa Hassan and Ahmed Hadji after they survived the 2010 terrorist attack on the Kyadondo rugby grounds in Kampala, Uganda. Prospect works directly with grassroots and larger-scale peacebuilding actors to address

the root causes and effects of violent conflicts. Their work focuses mainly on breaking cycles of conflict, promoting healing, mending broken community relationships, fostering justice, and strengthening community defences against violence.



PROSPECTINITIATIVE.ORG

POLE INSTITUTE

Pole Institute is an action research institute specialising in conflict prevention and resolution. Established in Goma, Pole has been involved in peacebuilding and conflict prevention in the Great Lakes Region in general, and in the Democratic

Republic of Congo in particular, since 1997. To prevent and resolve conflicts, Pole Institute uses research, communication, dialogue, advocacy, policy support, and capacity building as its main tools.




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PEACE BEYOND BORDERS
LA PAIX AU-DELÀ DES FRONTIÈRES