




RELEASE DATE
JUNE 2026

ELECTORAL VULNERABILITY INDEX 2026-2027

COUNTRY ANALYSIS

CZECHIA



EVI RISK INDEX: 1.6 | PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF ANY ELECTORAL VIOLENCE: 3.3%
REGIONAL RISK INDEX BASELINE (EU/EEA AND EU CANDIDATES, EXCL. COUNTRY): 9.5

SENATE AND MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS: OCTOBER 2026

BACKGROUND

Czechia is the lowest-risk case among the ten selected cases, not the lowest-risk country-election observation in the full 2026-2027 EVI dataset, with an EVI Risk Index of 1.6 and a predicted probability of any electoral violence of 3.3 percent.

The country benefits from a strong record of peaceful elections, credible institutions, a competitive multiparty system and high rule-of-law scores relative to the country-excluded regional Risk Index baseline. The EVI model indicates that nearly all major variables point in a risk-reducing direction.

Czechia is a parliamentary republic with a directly elected president, a bicameral legislature and a pluralistic party system. Political competition can be polarized, particularly around EU policy, migration, energy prices, disinformation and the role of populist parties, but electoral disputes are generally managed through institutions rather than by violence.

The main vulnerabilities are not linked to imminent violence but to broader democratic resilience. Czechia, like other Central European democracies, faces disinformation, attempts at external influence, distrust of mainstream parties, and tensions over social inequality.

These issues can shape campaign rhetoric, but they are unlikely to generate significant electoral violence in the 2026 cycle.

The low score should not lead to complacency. Even low-risk democracies can experience harassment of candidates, online threats, intimidation of journalists or pressure against minority communities. Prevention should therefore focus on maintaining institutional credibility and countering disinformation without over-securitizing the electoral process.

Czechia's inclusion in this selected Top 10 list is therefore best understood as comparative rather than alarming. Because the dataset includes several extremely high-risk cases, Czechia provides a useful benchmark for the protective effect of credible administration, the rule of law, and a peaceful electoral history.

Its analysis should preserve this distinction and avoid overstating threat levels.

UPCOMING ELECTIONS

Senate and municipal elections are scheduled for October 2026. Senate elections renew one-third of the 81-member upper chamber in two-round constituency contests, while municipal elections select local councils. These elections are politically important because they can test the strength of governing and opposition parties between parliamentary cycles and shape local governance across the country. The official electoral calendar should remain the controlling reference for final publication, but the cycle is predictable and does not currently present a material timing dispute.

The campaign is expected to focus on local service delivery, economic concerns, housing, energy, migration, public finance and the performance of national parties. Populist and anti-establishment actors may use the elections to mobilize against the government, but the institutional framework is stable.

Election administration is likely to remain technically sound. Czech elections rely on paper ballots, local commissions and established counting procedures. The risk of disputes exists in close local or Senate races, but legal complaint mechanisms are available and generally trusted.

The main risks concern information integrity and harassment rather than physical violence. Disinformation linked to foreign-policy issues, especially Russia's war against Ukraine and EU policy, may target voters or candidates. Local officials may also face threats on social media, particularly where national debates become personalized at municipal level.

Because the EVI risk is very low, recommendations should focus on the preservation of good practice, early communication, and resilience rather than on emergency intervention.

Municipal elections can still be politically sensitive because local authorities manage housing, planning, schools, social services and community-level integration. In small municipalities, personal disputes may overlap with party labels. This creates a need for accessible complaint channels and protection for local election officials, even where national risk remains very low.

The electoral calendar is predictable and does not currently raise major legal concerns. This predictability is itself a risk-reducing factor because parties, administrators, media and voters can prepare without uncertainty over timing or rules.

POTENTIAL DRIVERS OF CONFLICT

According to the Electoral Vulnerability Index (EVI), these are the factors that contribute most to the increased potential for violence:

Disinformation and foreign influence: External or domestic actors may attempt to amplify distrust in EU policy, migration or support for Ukraine. Such activity could increase polarization but is unlikely to produce large-scale violence.

Harassment of candidates and officials: Local campaigns can become personal, especially in small municipalities. Online threats or intimidation should be monitored even if physical risk is low.

POTENTIAL DRIVERS OF CONFLICT, CONT.

Polarization around national issues: Senate and municipal elections may become proxies for national party competition. If campaign rhetoric delegitimizes opponents, it may weaken trust even without immediate violence.

Localized protests: Demonstrations around economic or social issues may occur during the campaign, but Czech institutions have strong capacity to manage peaceful assembly.

Cyber and information security: Even if violence is unlikely, attempts to disrupt electoral websites, spread false procedural information or undermine confidence in counting could create localized confusion. Preparedness should be proportionate but visible.

RECOMMENDATIONS

NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

- Electoral authorities should maintain clear public communication on voting procedures, complaint mechanisms and result publication. Continuity of trusted practice is the main prevention tool.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND MEDIA

- Longer-term prevention requires credible judicial and anti-corruption reforms. Reducing perceived state capture would address one of the main sources of democratic distrust.

POLITICAL PARTIES

- Parties should avoid rhetoric that delegitimizes opponents or local election officials. Candidate protection and reporting channels for harassment should be reinforced.

INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS

- International engagement should remain light-touch and focused on information integrity, cyber resilience and exchange of good practice among European electoral authorities.

LOCAL ELECTION OFFICIALS

- Local officials should have clear guidance for reporting harassment, procedural confusion and cyber incidents. Maintaining confidence at municipal level helps prevent small disputes from being reframed as national institutional failures.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Czech Statistical Office electoral data; Ministry of the Interior of Czechia; Senate of the Czech Republic; OSCE/ODIHR; European Commission Rule of Law Report; Freedom House; V-Dem country data; Czech public broadcaster; Reuters.